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Abstract
This paper provides an evaluation of the possible macroeconomic effects of EU
financial assistance, such as the Pre-Accession Structural Funds, on the economic
development of the CEECs. The experience of the Cohesion countries (Portugal,
Ireland, Greece and Spain) with the Community Support Frameworks (CSF) is
presented and discussed. The empirical assessment suggests that the Pre-Accession
Structural Funds, which are similar in structure and rationale with the CSFs, can have an
important bearing on the development of the transition countries. The analysis shows
that the advantage that the CEECs can take of the Pre-Accession Structural Programs to
promote development and the catch-up process is neither automatic nor predetermined.
It depends on the specific micro-macroeconomic policies that the CEECs follow during
the application of the programs. It also depends on how efficiently these programs are
implemented.
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Foreword
by János Gács
This paper is one of the results of a broad, multi-year research project of the
Economic Transition and Integration  Project of IIASA entitled “Catching Up and EU
Accession – Prospects for First and Second Wave Countries”. The research was
particularly encouraged by IIASA’s Swedish and Hungarian national member
organizations, while financial support was provided by the (then) Swedish national
member organization, the Swedish Council for Planning and Coordination of Research
(FRN). Preparations for the project started in 1999. In addition to other forms of
communication two workshops, one in Budapest in January 2000, and one in Stockholm
in May 2001, helped to elaborate the research agenda, coordinate collaborative work
and discuss results. Publication of the studies prepared in the framework of this projects
started in September 2001.
The main ideas of the research project can be summarized as follows.
The accession of the Central and East European countries (CEECs) to the EU is
likely to lead to conflicts between these countries and the incumbent members unless
there is a rapid narrowing of the gap in per capita incomes between them. The CEECs
are much poorer and have proportionately much larger agricultural sectors than the
average EU country, and their combined populations make up between one-fourth and
one-third of that of the current EU. Due to these characteristics there is concern in  EU
member states about a mass migration from the East following accession, about social
and environmental “dumping” from CEECs, and about an increased demand by the
CEECs on the EU's Structural and Cohesion Funds, as well as on the funds provided
under the Common Agricultural Policy.
These concerns, however, are counterbalanced to a large degree by a “catching
up” predicted by both theory and experience: poorer countries, unless their development
is impeded by institutional barriers, usually develop faster than richer ones, and there is
a tendency toward convergence in levels of GDP per capita. In recent years, this
catching up process seems to have started. In addition, trends in capital inflows and
stock market developments suggest that the expected return on capital in the region is
sufficiently high to support the buildup of stronger production capacities.
The research project on catching up studied the pattern according to which
preparations for membership can trigger changes that will affect the growth process
before and after membership. Special attention was paid to CEECs in different
positions: those that started negotiations in 1998 and may reach membership first, and
those that started negotiations in 2000. The effects on the sources of growth in both the
pre-accession and post-accession periods were studied.
vThe following specific topics were investigated by the contributors of the
project: the relevance of the export led East Asian development experience for CEECs;
the forces of convergence and divergence that worked in the less developed EU member
states (Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece) following their accession; the mixed
experience of East Germany in catching up in a growth theoretic perspective; the role of
domestic savings and savings behavior in the catch-up process; the likely pattern of the
so-called Balassa-Samuelson process (real appreciation associated with the expected
rapid productivity growth) in the course of the convergence; evaluation of the possible
effects of EU structural aid on the candidate countries’ development based on the
experience of the cohesion countries of the EU; financial convergence of the candidate
countries to the EU and the growth process; the role of institutions in the process of
transition and catching up; and the relationship between the growth process and human
development (health, education, standard of living, including inequality) in the context
of EU accession.
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1The Macroeconomic Effect of EU Structural Transfers on the
Cohesion Countries and Lessons for the CEECs
Sarantis E.G. Lolos
1. Introduction
The contribution of the Structural Funds through the Community Support
Framework (the CSF) to less developed regions is substantial. On the one hand, the CSF
aims at transferring income to backward regions and thus increasing the average welfare
of the people. On the other hand, it aims at promoting growth in these regions.
Furthermore, the CSF programmes are strictly targeted, aiming at financing specific
infrastructure investment projects and manpower training programmes. The
accumulation of public capital, of human capital and also of knowledge deriving from
the programmes strengthens the development process. Thus, the CSF activates an
important mechanism of endogenous accumulation, necessary for the economic
development of the European periphery.
The purpose of this study is to provide an evaluation of the possible
macroeconomic effects of EU financial assistance, such as the Pre-Accession Structural
Funds, on the economic development of the CEECs. Naturally, the fact that our
approach focuses on the macroeconomic aspects of the EU structural funds does not
mean that other aspects are less important. However, a wider treatment of these issues
cannot be considered within the limited space of this paper and is, therefore, left out of
the discussion.
This discussion is based on the experience of the, so-called, cohesion countries
(Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) with the CSFs. It is also based on the similarity of
the CSFs to the cohesion countries with the pre-accession funds to the transition
countries.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, the rationale and size of the
EU structural interventions is briefly presented as well as their role in promoting
economic growth and structural change. In Section 3, the channels through which the
EU funds affect the economy are discussed, while in Section 4 the evaluation
approaches are presented. Section 5 reviews the models used for the macroeconomic
evaluation of the CSF effects on the economy and the their results are presented and
summarized. In Section 6, the EU pre-accession funding is presented, together with its
likely macroeconomic effect on the CEECs. Finally, Section 7 concludes the issue.
22. Aim and size of EU structural interventions
The traditional Solow-Swan growth models explain economic growth through
exogenous technical progress, the sources of which are not explained. The economies of
the various countries are expected to converge since the factors of production exhibit
diminishing returns and all countries have similar rates of technical progress. Also,
countries are expected to converge to their long-run steady state growth rate, while
policy interventions only affect the transition path. However, the empirical evidence
shows that poorer countries are not catching up with the richer ones, owing to the
absence of diminishing returns of factors of production. Nevertheless, countries do
converge to their own steady states but at an uncertain rate and the factors affecting
economic growth are still unclear and the issue of convergence is unresolved.1
Recent advances of endogenous growth theory have put emphasis on the role of
externalities and spillovers which come about through investment in physical
infrastructure and human capital, and benefit the productive capacity of the economy.2
There now exists a bulk of empirical research, also covering the lagging behind
Southern European countries, which shows that the improvement of physical
infrastructure and the upgrading of human capital have a positive impact on economic
growth. It should be added, however, that these empirical issues are at the center of
research interest, and there is substantial criticism on how the impact of infrastructure
and human capital investment is quantified in these studies.3
Towards the end of 1980s, the European Communities carried out a substantial
reform of the Community Budget taking specific actions in order to accelerate economic
development in the regions lagging behind. These actions aimed at strengthening the
factors that are thought to be playing a decisive role in promoting growth and
competitiveness and help to reduce economic disparities within the European territory.
The factors responsible for the achievement of economic and social cohesion were to be
strengthened i.e. physical infrastructure, human capital and the capacity to innovate,
although a direct relation between these factors and growth was not fully established.
Since the end of 1980s, supporting economic and social cohesion remained the key
objective of the EU. The instrument to fulfill this objective has been the European
Structural Funds aiming at both promoting growth in and transferring income to the
backward regions.
The result of this fiscal reform was a series of measures integrated in a
comprehensive framework, the Community Support Framework (CSF) which was the
main instrument for the Community’s regional and structural policies. The
Community’s principal instruments for fulfilling this commitment are its Structural
Funds, namely the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the European Social
Funds (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF,
                                                
1
 There is a great number of empirical studies using cross-section data which come to the
conclusion that convergence among various economies is possible, but there is also a great
number of studies using time series data which come to the opposite conclusion. The discussion
of the growth evidence is beyond the scope of this work. For a recent survey on these issues see
Temple (1998).
2
 See the pioneering works of Lucas (1988), Romer (1986) and Aschauer (1989).
3
 See Bradley et al. (2000) for a presentation of recent empirical studies on endogenous growth
models for the cohesion countries and their relation to the Structural Funds interventions.
3commonly known as FEOGA), and since 1993 the Cohesion Fund. However, the first
attempt to support the less developed European regions was the Integrated
Mediterranean Programmes of the second half of the 1980s which were directed to the
South-European countries.4
The main objectives of the Community Support Framework (according to their
so-called “objectives”) include:
Objective 1: Promotion of the development and structural adjustment of regions
whose development is lagging behind.
Objective 2: Support of regions seriously affected by industrial decline.
Objective 3: Combating of long-term unemployment.
Objective 4: Facilitation of the vocational integration of young people.
Objective 5a: Adjustment of agricultural structures.
Objective 5b: Promoting rural development in the context of prospective CAP reform.
Objective 6: Development of sparsely populated areas.5
In 1989, the first CSF was approved by the European Commission to cover the
period 1989-1993, since the widening of regional disparities could threaten the
successful realization of the Single Market. The programme provided 37.3 billion ECUs
(at 1989 prices) allocated to seven countries. As Beutel (1998) rightly notes, the aid
package in favor of the least developed regions has sometimes been compared to the
European Recovery Programme. In the period from April 1948 to June 1952 Western
Europe received 12 billion dollars of aid, a sum that was equivalent to 2.1 percent of the
average of the receiver nations' GDP. Indeed Community grants made available for the
five year period from 1989 to 1993 and the six year period 1994-99 represent a similar
magnitude in terms of GDP.
In 1992, the second CSF was decided. The Commission’s intention was to
provide assistance to regions whose development was lagging behind, in view of the
third stage of EMU. The second CSF for the period 1994-99 had a total volume of 208.7
billion ECUs (at 1994 prices). It was allocated to Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
UK-N. Ireland and Germany. In terms of GDP, the CSF 1994-99 amounted to about 2
per cent of the receiver countries’ GDP on average (over 3 per cent of GDP for Greece
and Portugal).
Finally, in 1997, a new round of EU structural interventions, the CSF for the
period 2000-2006, was decided by the European Commission arising from the
document Agenda 2000. The current CSF covers the years from 2000 to 2006 and aims
at promoting cohesion during the first period of the operation of the EMU. The EU
funds amount to about 1.6 per cent of the cohesion countries’ GDP on average (about 3
per cent of GDP for Greece and Portugal). Also, in Agenda 2000 there is provision for
pre-accession EU financing to the candidate Central and Eastern European Countries.
See Section 6, below.
                                                
4
 The European Commission also promotes actions of special interest for the support of
economic and social fiber, the Community Initiatives, like ENVIREG, INTERREG, STRIDE,
LEADER, etc.
5
 Applying only to CSF 2000-06.
4Note that Objective 1, that is, the promotion of development and structural
adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind, is the most important of
these objectives in terms of the amount of financial assistance given to the eligible
regions. Objective 1 covers the whole of Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and many regions of
Spain. These are the less developed countries of the EU and they are frequently referred
as “countries of Objective 1”.
Table 1 presents the size of the structural intervention through the CSF and the sources
of finance (EU and national) over the ten year period 1989-99 for the cohesion countries
(Objective 1).
The CSF includes Operational Programmes which are set in a comprehensive
framework. The Operational Programmes have either a national coverage (e.g.
Operational Programme for Industry) or a regional coverage (e.g. in Greece there are 13
Regional Operational Programmes) and in terms of allocated funds they are almost
equally important as the national programmes.6 The Operational Programmes are
financed by EU transfers from the Structural Funds, as well as by national sources of the
beneficiary country at about equal proportions; a contribution is also provided by the
private sector.7
Table 1: Structural Intervention and GDP(a)
Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Four
countries,
total
1989-93
Total expenditure 17549 21673 11449 30279 80950
Community interventions 10401 10813 5071 14733 41017
National interventions 7148 10860 6378 15546 39933
Total expenditure (% of GDP) 4.4 6.0 5.8 1.5 2.8
Community interventions (% of GDP) 2.6 3.0 2.5 0.7 1.4
National interventions (% of GDP)(b) 1.8 3.0 3.3 0.8 1.4
1994-99
Total expenditure 34760 31795 13077 82222 161854
Community interventions 17736 17642 7403 42400 85181
National interventions 17025 14153 5674 39822 76673
Total expenditure (% of GDP) 6.9 6.6 4.2 3.1 4.1
Community interventions (% of GDP) 3.5 3.7 2.4 1.6 2.2
National interventions (% of GDP)(b) 3.4 3.0 1.8 1.5 1.9
Source: European Commission; (a) absolute data in million 1994 ECU, (b) including
contribution of private sector.
                                                
6
 For example, the regional programmes of the Greek CSFs absorb about 40 per cent of total
funds.
7
 Note that the relative financial contributions should be in line with the so called “additionality
condition”, according to which public expenditure of the beneficiary country should be
maintained at the programmed level, independently of the CSF. The CSF programmes come on
top of existing expenditures and there is no substitution.
5Table 2 shows the percentage share of EU structural intervention in GDP and
fixed capital formation of Objective 1 countries, over the period 1989-2006. Note the
substantial contribution of EU funds to total investment, especially in Greece and
Portugal, without which economic growth would have been less in the cohesion
countries.
Table 2: EU Structural Funds to Cohesion Countries (1989-2006)(a)
Greece Portugal Ireland Spain Four
countries
total
Share in GDP, %
1989-93 2.6 3.0 2.5 0.7 1.4
1994-99(b) 3.0 3.3 1.9 1.5 2.0
2000-06 2.8 2.9 0.6 1.3 1.6
Share in Fixed Capital Formation, %
1989-93 11.8 12.4 15.0 2.9 5.5
1994-99 14.6 14.2 9.6 6.7 8.9
2000-06 12.3 11.4 2.6 5.5 6.9
Source: CEC (2001, p. 122); estimates based on Eurostat data and projections for 2000-06.
(a) Including Structural and Cohesion Funds; commitment up to 1999; forecasts for 2000-06.
(b) Revised figures (compared to those of Table 1, above).
The EU financing by type and by area of intervention through the Structural
Funds is shown in Tables 3 and 4, below.
The development priorities of the programme include the creation of economic
infrastructure, the support of productive investment and directly related infrastructure.
They also include the development of human resources, agricultural and rural
development. Finally, the CSF aims at developing the regions’ growth potential, local
development and technical assistance.
Table 3: Structural Funds by type of intervention under Objective 1
% of total
1989-1993 1994-1999 2000-2006
Infrastructure 35.2 29.8 34.3
Human resources 29.6 24.5 23.9
Productive environment 33.6 41.0 34.8
Other 1.6 4.7 7.0
Source: CEC (2001, p. 126)
Around 30-35 per cent of expenditure is spent on investment in new physical
infrastructure (construction, machinery and equipment). The increase in 2000-06 is due
to increased needs from the cohesion countries (mainly transport networks). Note that if
the Cohesion Fund is included, infrastructure investment represents more than 40 per
cent of total investment allocated to the Objective 1 regions.
6A substantial part (about 25 per cent) is allocated to salaries, allowances and
transfer payments to improve human resources. The gradual decline of human resources
investment is compensated by the higher priority given to active labor market policies.
Finally, a proportion of over 35 per cent of total expenditure supports productive
environment (investment), including direct aid to industry. It also includes the
improvement of access to peripheral regions, and developing research activities for the
enhancement of the “information society” which without EU support would not be
carried out, due to national fiscal constraints.
Table 4: Resources of Cohesion Fund by area of intervention, 1993-99
Transport
% of total
Environment
% of total
Total
EUR Mn
Greece 51.2 48.8 2998
Spain 49.7 50.3 9251
Ireland 50.0 50.0 1495
Portugal 48.1 51.9 3005
Total 49.7 50.3 16761
Source: CEC (2001, p. 127)
The resources of the Cohesion Fund, allocated to countries with GDP per head
below 90 per cent of EU average, are distributed between transport and environment at
about equal proportions. Within transport there is increased importance towards
investment in railways, while in environment increased importance is given to waste
water facilities in order to meet obligations imposed by EU directives.
3. The effect of Structural Funds on the economy
3.1. The transmission mechanism
The principal channels through which the CSF affects the economy are usually
considered to be the following:
The EU Transfer
Initially, there is the EU capital inflow of the CSF, which is identified as an
autonomous capital flow. This amount is directly reflected in the balance of transfers of
the current account.
Demand Side Effects
The demand effects manifest themselves through the usual multiplier process
and they are of a short-term nature. The demand effects stop with the termination of the
Programme. The demand effects are of three kinds:
• The first includes financial assistance to public investment (infrastructure
investment), including investment to public enterprises. These funds are registered
in the Public Investment Programme and are the most important component of the
CSF.
7• The second channel is related to financial assistance for the improvement of
human resources and skills. These programmes concern education and training for
the upgrading of the labor force and the improvement of the efficiency of
enterprises. Their direct short-run effect is to a great extent reflected in the
creation of personal incomes through transfers to households. It is also reflected in
the improvement of the profitability of enterprises through a direct effect on
profits.
• The third transmission channel refers to various forms of financial assistance to
enterprises for restructuring and the improvement of competitiveness.
Supply Side Effects
Apart from the demand side effects, the various components of financial
assistance through the CSF have also important implications on the supply side of the
economy. These supply side effects stem from an improvement in the productive
capacity of the economy and they manifest themselves during the implementation and
especially after the termination of the programme. They are of a long-run nature and
they are induced by improvements in productivity of various sectors through investment
in physical and human capital.
For example, the expenditure for the construction of a new road will boost
incomes and employment (demand effect). At the same time the construction of the road
will increase the productivity of the transport sector. This will result to a decrease in the
transport cost which will benefit the other sectors of the economy (supply-side effect).
3.2. Assumptions and accompanying policies
According to the rationale of the CSF, that is the boost of demand and also the
improvement of the supply side of the economy, the CSF effects on the economy are
conditional to certain plausible assumptions, regarding the implementation of the
Programme:8
• The programmed CSF related expenditures are fully absorbed, which affects
mostly the demand side effects.
• The programme is efficiently implemented by the authorities, which mostly affects
the supply effects.
 It is obvious that any departure from these assumptions (partial absorption,
inefficient implementation, etc.) will reduce the total impact of the CSF and will curtail
the beneficial influences on the economy.
 These emphasize the importance of the capacity of the recipient regions to take
full advantage of the allocated EU funding. The inability to absorb the funds may arise
from incomplete planning, overoptimistic setting of targets or insufficient feasibility-
implementation studies. It may be also due to the existing inadequate institutional
framework, to management weaknesses or to public resistance in the implementation of
certain projects. Also, it may arise from unfulfilled co-financing requirements stemming
either from fiscal problems in the case of national budget or from difficulties in
                                                
8
 For a more detailed discussion see Hervé (1999)
8mobilizing private funds. The beneficial impact on the economy will be curtailed also if
the additionality condition is not observed or in case the implementation of the
programmes creates conditions of the “Dutch disease” through which factor prices
become distorted.
 Furthermore, the CSF effects depend on the actual state of the economy, i.e. of the
micro-macro economic regimes under which the economy operates during the
programmes’ application period.9 This is so since the CSF application creates leakages,
in terms of output and employment, which depend on the conditions prevailing in the
economy. These leakages come either from the demand or from the supply side. The
magnitude and the origin of these leakages is related to the micro-macro economic
regimes under which the economy operates.
 The issue of the leakages in the CSF implementation is clarified by considering
two extreme situations of the functioning of the economy.
• The first polar case characterizes an economy which is constantly at full capacity
due to a full flexibility of prices, wages, interest rates, and possibly exchange
rates. In such a case, demand effects are necessarily nil at the aggregate level. Any
additional demand will crowd out existing demand leaving total output
unchanged, except for some reallocation of factors across sectors.
 In this case there is a possibility that the rate of growth, that is the current
allocation of output between investment and consumption, will be affected by the
additional demand. However, this effect is likely to be rather small, because
additional investment undertaken under the CSF is likely to crowd out private
investment in such a full-employment framework. The only positive effect left is
the direct productivity effect which may be associated with the CSF.
• On the other extreme we may assume that the economy is of the fix-price type and
exhibits excess capacities in all sectors and unemployment in all labor markets. In
such a case, the supply effects are nil and we have pure demand and multiplier
effects which, however, are possibly reduced by the various usual leakages (e.g.
imports, monetary tensions in case the CSF is not accompanied by an
expansionary monetary policy).
The above schematic presentation of the two polar cases demonstrates that some
leakages stemming from the demand and the supply sides of the programme are
unavoidable, since reality lies between the two extremes. It thus follows that a reduction
of these leakages should be also an objective for the efficient implementation of the
CSF.
This can be achieved by the adoption of a suitable set of policy measures
(accompanying policies), aiming at promoting the structural reform of the economy at
both the micro and the macro level. In fact, there should be an internal consistency of
both macroeconomic and microeconomic policies in the recipient countries. These
policies should be an integral part of the CSF implementation.
They include microeconomic measures related to structural adjustment, labor
market policies, competition policies, market liberalization etc. At the macro level the
                                                
 
9
 For a detailed elaboration see Lolos et al. (1995).
9accompanying policies should be directed towards the reduction of macroeconomic
imbalances in order to promote macroeconomic stability. They should be also directed
towards macroeconomic restructuring in favor of investment in order to boost the
productivity of the economy and eventually to promote economic growth.
4. Evaluation approaches
As discussed above, the CSF is an integrated structural programme aiming at
transferring income to lagging behind regions and also at enhancing the productivity of
the economy in the European “periphery”. As a consequence, it should not be evaluated
only with respect to its direct impact on the economy, but also with respect to its
medium-term effects on the improvement of competitiveness and the effective
utilization of the productive capacity.
In assessing an investment project, two types of evaluation come to mind: on the
one hand traditional cost-benefit analysis, or, on the other hand macro-analysis, in the
case of a sizable project or an extended programme including a number of projects.
The evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of the CSF on the economy has
been approached using economy-wide empirical models. The evaluations are
distinguished between ex-ante, on-going and ex-post evaluations, all being an integral
part of planning.
In the context of structural policies, the ex-ante evaluation process has a number
of objectives (see also Figure 1, below):
• An assessment of whether the overall Programme is an appropriate means for
addressing the issues confronting the region or sector.
• An assessment of whether the Programme has well defined strategic axes,
priorities and objectives and if it reflects an informed opinion as to whether
these are relevant and can actually be achieved.
• A contribution to the quantification of the objectives and the establishment of a
basis for both monitoring and future evaluation.
• Should analyze the adequacy of the implementation and monitoring
arrangements and help with the design of project selection procedures and
criteria.
• The Commission aims to carry out a thorough analysis, notably at the level of
the plan before the termination of the CSF.
 According to the European Commission, “for the ex-ante evaluation of the
macroeconomic impact of major Objective 1 Plans (cohesion countries, Southern Italy
and Eastern Germany), only macroeconomic modeling can simulate the complex
interdependencies between economic variables at the macroeconomic level. The model
should feature both a demand side and a supply side.  Improvement of the supply side is
the main objective of Structural Funds interventions” (CEC, 1999, Annex II).10
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 See also MEANS (1999), for a detailed original discussion of current methodological
practices.
10
 
 Figure 1: Key components of ex-ante evaluation
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 Source: CEC (1999, p.6). Key components of ex-ante evaluation as defined at
articles 40 and 41 of the Regulation.
 
 As a rule, the supply side of the model should include the principal determinants
of the productive potential of an economy in a way that reflects the ways in which
Structural Funds interventions in areas such as infrastructure, human capital and
productive investment influence productive potential. Furthermore, the actual use of
productive potential in terms of output and prices is to be defined. As for the demand
side of the model, the behavioral equations for private consumption, private investment,
and government expenditure as well exports and imports need to be specified.
 In view of the importance of estimates of employment effects, the model should
also include a labor market, featuring labor demand and labor supply or, alternatively, a
wage equation. The relation between wages and employment as well as the
determination of the labor force by migration and participation should be defined
explicitly.
 The government sector should distinguish investment, purchases of goods and
services and employment (possibly with a sub-category on education and training), as
well as identify the national and EU co-financing of broad Structural Funds categories.
By varying the assumed additionality of public expenditure, it should be capable of
modeling a situation of EU funding alone as well as of EU funding and national funding
together, both excluding private co-financing. In addition, the model should contain a
government budget constraint and a specification of transfers to and from the EU so that
11
the opportunity costs of public spending can be taken into account (i.e. the effects of
alternative uses of EU and national funds).
 Finally, according to the European Commission, the sensitivity of results to
changes in Structural Funds spending and in economic policy should be demonstrated.
As regards the monetary policy regime, interest and exchange rates can be exogenous
and allow for running simulations with fixed nominal interest and exchange rates.
 In brief, the (ex-ante) evaluation procedure is as follows:
• First, a restatement of the CSF programmes and actions is needed in terms of
the model variables.11 This is necessary since the classification of the CSF
expenditures, as presented in the Programme, is useful in an operational sense
but it is inadequate for quantitative economic analysis and evaluation.
• Then, the model has to be estimated using observations about the economy
under examination.
• The next step is to establish a run of the model (the “base-run”) for a period
covering the implementation period of the CSF. In ex-ante evaluations a model
projection is needed where a full implementation of the CSF is assumed. This
model simulation is the “base-run” or the “full-CSF” scenario.
• We can then establish a second simulation of the model having excluded part
or the whole of the CSF from certain variables of the model associated with the
CSF implementation.
• Comparing these two scenarios we get an indication of the expected effect of
the CSF on the economy (e.g. effect on GDP, effect on employment, prices,
investment, etc.).
Thus, the CSF effect is quantitatively identified as deviations between alternative
simulation scenarios. These scenarios are arrived at by modifying the magnitude of the
exogenous variables of the models related to the CSF implementation.
Note that, using alternative simulation scenarios, it is possible to quantify
separately the demand and the supply effects of the CSF, as well as specific components
of the CSF (e.g. public investment or training programmes). It should be noted,
however, that the precise quantification of the supply side factors is an extremely
difficult issue.12
The possibility of carrying out this analysis depends on the model in hand.13 Thus,
in some models it involves some parallel micro-economic analysis aimed at determining
the impact of the CSF projects upon the productivity of the economy. In other models
the supply side effects are endogenized. Finally, in other models of pure Keynesian
inspiration where the emphasis is put on the demand side and supply side phenomena
are partially treated, only one alternative scenario can be obtained, the non-CSF
scenario, which is derived simply by eliminating all CSF inflows.
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 For a detailed presentation see Lolos and Zonzilos (1992).
12
 For a comprehensive discussion of this see Bradley et al. (1991).
13
 See also the next section with reference to particular models that have been used for the CSF
evaluation.
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5. Empirical results of the CSF effect on the cohesion
countries
In this section the empirical results of the Structural Funds’ effect on the cohesion
economies are presented and discussed. This effect is evaluated with the help of  various
empirical models. The results of these models mainly refer to the quantification of the
effect of the Community Support Frameworks of the periods 1989-93 and 1994-99 on
economic variables, such as GDP growth, employment, prices, investment, etc.
In fact, the great majority of the models that are used usually evaluate the effect of
the Objective 1 part of the CSF on the cohesion countries. Note also that although an
overwhelming part of the programs and financial assistance through the CSFs is
regional (around 40 per cent in terms of allocated funds), the aggregate character of the
models does not distinguish between regional and national effects. Thus the models
capture the overall effect of the CSF actions on the economy, after the diffusion of the
regional actions.
5.1. The macroeconomic models used
In the case of the lagging behind European regions, a great variety of empirical
models of various philosophies were used for the quantitative evaluation of the CSF
effect, in fact for the ex-ante evaluation of the CSF, on the economy. Some examples
are given below:
Econometric Models
• The HERMES14 model for the evaluation of the CSF 1989-93 (Ireland15).
 The model is an econometric disaggregated model comprising of six sectors. It
also allows to analyze the feedback mechanisms and dynamic properties (monetary and
real) of the economy over the long run. The HERMES-Ireland model is made of about
650 equations and 850 variables.
• The HERMIN16 model for the evaluation of the CSF 1989-93 (Ireland17) and the CSF
1994-99 (Portugal,18 Spain19and Ireland20).
 The model is an extension of the previous one to allow for the treatment of both
demand and the supply-side shocks induced by the implementation of the CSF. To
enable the latter to be integrated into the analysis seven microeconomic studies were
                                                
 
14
 The model was developed by DG for Science Research and Development to study the
medium to long term development of the Community countries on the basis of microeconomic
analysis. See HERMES (1993).
 
15
 See CEC (1991).
 
16
 The model was initially developed at the Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin.
See, for instance, Bradley and Whelan (1990), Bradley et al. (1991).
 
17
 See CEC (1991).
 
18
 See Bradley et al. (1994, 1995).
 
19
 See Herce and Sosvilla-Rivero (1994); also Bradley et al. (1995).
 
20
 See Bradley et al. (1994, 1995).
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carried out (industrial competitiveness, transport costs, industrial market structure, labor
market, agriculture and food industry, services, industrial sector).
 The results point to the important contribution of the CSF on the development of
EU’s periphery countries. They differ from one to another country, depending on the
particular characteristics of each country. The overall positive effects are more
pronounced in Portugal and less so in Spain and Ireland. Spain and Ireland have much
larger supply effects than Portugal.
• The QUEST II21 model for the CSF (1989-93 and 1994-99), for Portugal, Spain,
Ireland and Greece.22
 The model can be characterized as a modern version of the Neoclassical-
Keynesian synthesis. The behavioral equations are based on microeconomic principles
of intertemporal optimizing behavior of households and firms, and the supply side of the
economy is modeled explicitly via a neoclassical production function. The steady state
growth rate is essentially determined by the rate of (exogenous) technical progress and
the growth rate of the population. Also the real rate of interest in the long run is
determined by private savings behavior, especially the discount rate of private
households. Similarly, the real exchange rate equilibrates the current account in the long
run, i.e. it moves in such a way as to make the net foreign asset position of the country
sustainable. In this type of model economic policy will not be able to change the long
run growth rate, unless it is able to affect the rate of time preference, the rate of
technical progress or the growth rate of the population. It can, however, affect the long
run level of output and thereby the transitory growth rate of the economy over extended
periods of time until the new (steady state) income level is reached.
 The results showed that the CSFs may lead to an increase of the annual GDP
growth rate by up to 0.3 per cent on average for Portugal, Greece, Ireland but less so in
Spain. Also, after the termination of the programmes’ implementation there remains for
some time a positive supply-side effect. The CSF interventions may also lead to a
reduction in the rate of unemployment by up to 0.2 to 0.3 per cent.
• A Four-Sector Macroeconomic Model for the evaluation of the CSF 1994-99 for
Greece23).
 The model is based on the HERMIN model and consists of four sectors of
economic activity (traded, non-traded goods, the public and the agricultural sectors). It
includes a detailed system of price formation, wage setting and public finances. The
dynamic properties and multiplier effects are thoroughly analyzed. CSF flows cause
both a rise in total demand and in domestic supply through positive supply-side
externalities. The evaluation distinguishes between a very low and a full degree of
utilizing the plausible opportunities.
 The conclusion is that in the absence of externalities, CSF actions produce only
a temporary rise in economic activity and employment. After the period of inflows
expires, the economy will return to the course that would have been without the funds.
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 The QUEST II model was developed by DG II of the European Commission. See Roeger and
Veld (1997).
 
22
 See Roeger (1998).
 
23
 See Christodoulakis and Kalyvitis (1998).
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If all externalities are assumed to operate, even at moderate scale, then output,
productivity, employment and the exporting capacity of Greece improve significantly24.
• An econometric Keynesian25 macro-model for the evaluation of the Greek CSF 1989-
93.
 The model is Keynesian in inspiration and essentially demand driven; it is
highly dynamic using extensively error correction formulation and cointegration
techniques in the specification of most behavioral equations. The formulation of the
model is essentially determined by the objective of the study. The financial sector of the
economy is not modeled, although financial flows affect economic activity through
investment functions. Interest rates and the exchange rate as well as exports are treated
exogenously. Despite its aggregate character, the model describes adequately the main
macroeconomic linkages of the Greek economy and offers answers to important
questions regarding the CSF impact. The model is estimated over the period 1960-88,
using annual observations for the Greek economy.
 The results show that the EU component of the Greek CSF is expected to
increase the annual rate of growth by around 0.5 per cent, also creating around 50,000
new jobs. The effect on the inflation rate is marginal.
• The Wharton-UAM  model for the evaluation of the Spanish CSF 1989-9326.
 The model is an econometric large-scale demand model, comprising of 558
equations and 743 variables. It is also a sectoral model with equations specifying value-
added by sector. The model includes the monetary side of the economy. The empirical
results are presented in Section 5.2, below.
 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Models
• A CGE27 model for the evaluation of the Greek CSF 1989-93 and 1994-99.28
 The model is an application to the Greek economy of the extended Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) model. It is a micro-macro simulation model, which
combines a standard Computable General Equilibrium framework with full-fledged
macroeconomic closures. Special emphasis is put on the financial sector, foreign
exchange and capital movements. It is able to describe the likely short-run demand
effects of the CSF on main economic variables, such as, effective demand, GDP, the
balance of payments, the budget, employment, inflation etc. Furthermore, the model is
well equipped to deal with the structural and supply side effects of the CSF. The model
distinguishes between various sectors and markets. The CGE model was calibrated for
the year 1988 for the evaluation of CSF 1989-93 and for the year 1993 for the
evaluation of CSF 1994-99.
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 For instance, the economy achieves an annual growth rate 0.4 per cent higher for 16 years
after the termination of the CSF.
 
25
 The model was developed by Lolos and Zonzilos (1994). See also CEC (1991).
 
26
 See CEC (1991).
 
27
 The model was initially developed by the IMF and then by the OECD (the B-B-M model).
See Bourguignon et al. (1989).
 
28
 See Lolos et al. (1995) for the CSF 1989-1993. Also Lolos and Theodoulides (2001) for the
CSF 1994-1999.
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 The results of the ex-ante evaluation showed that at the end of the programme
the level of GDP would be higher by about 3 per cent in relation to its corresponding
level without the EU contribution.  Over half of this increase is due to the demand side
effects, while the impact of the supply side factors amounts to less than half of the total
increase. With regard to employment, the results showed that the efficient
implementation of the CSF would lead to a maximum number of around 100,000 new
jobs. About half of these new jobs would be due to demand factors and have a
temporary character. The rest will come about from factors affecting the supply side of
the economy and are definitely of a permanent nature.
 The model was also used for the ex-post evaluation of the CSF 1989-93. The
results showed that the direct impact of the CSF on the Greek economy which is related
to the demand side effect seems not to be inferior to the ex-ante estimates. As far as the
creation of employment is concerned, there has been an actual increase in new jobs of
60,000, over the period 1989-1993, while the CSF played a decisive role in job creation,
since it is estimated that it has been responsible for about 35,000 new jobs. On the
contrary, serious differences were observed on the effect of the CSF on the supply side
factors which are responsible for the improvement of competitiveness of the Greek
economy. We return to the issue of ex-post evaluation.
• A Dynamic CGE29 model for the evaluation of the Portuguese CSF 1989-93.
 It is a long-run two-sector growth model that builds upon the recent endogenous
growth literature. It evaluates the impact of structural policies on both demand and
supply sides, by analyzing optimal accumulation of public and private capital and
human capital. Human capital is assumed to reflect the level of knowledge available in
the economy and is a source of endogenous growth. Public capital, which represents
public infrastructures, is an externality to private production. The accumulation of
public capital is responsive to economic incentives and is also a source of endogenous
growth. In the determination of the optimal path for the economy, the evolution of both
the public sector account and the current account plays a crucial role. The model
consists of nine equations and, because of its complexity is not solved analytically but is
parameterized and solved numerically.
 The empirical results of the ex-ante evaluation showed that EU structural
programmes induce an important and permanent improvement in the annual rate of
growth of the order of 0.5 per cent. They also increase the share of private investment in
GDP at a rate between 1.0 and 1.5 percentage point per year. Finally, they contribute
markedly to the real convergence of the Portuguese economy to the EU standards.
 Input-Output Models
• Input-Output models for the CSF (1989-93 and 1994-99), for the countries or regions
of Objective 1 (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy, UK-N. Ireland).30
 The model is a comparative statics input-output sectoral (highly disaggregated)
system concentrating on the short-term CSF impacts. It has been developed for the
Directorate-General for Regional Policies and Cohesion to evaluate the economic
impacts of Structural Funds intervention with the main purpose to establish a
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 See Pereira and Gaspar (1999). Also CEC (1991).
 
30
 See Beutel (1990, 1995).
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harmonized data base and methodology for impact analysis. With a new set of
harmonized input-output tables Eurostat is providing the appropriate data base for such
analysis.
 The results showed that the Community grants of the CSF 1989-93 could raise
economic growth in Portugal by 3 per cent, in Ireland by 1.4 per cent, in Southern Spain
by 1.0 per cent, in Southern Italy by 0.8 per cent and in Northern Ireland by 0.9 per
cent, while in Greece by 2.8 per cent. However, using a very similar model for the
evaluation of the CSF 1994-99, the respective figures seem to be on the low side (0.5,
0.5, 0.4, 0.2, 0.2, 0.5). The CSF has an important bearing on gross capital formation of
the recipient regions, on the reduction of unemployment and on structural change.
• Dynamic Input-Output models for the CSF (1989-93 and 1994-99), for the countries
or regions of Objective 1 (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy, UK-N. Ireland,
Germany-Eastern).31
 In extension of the previous studies, a dynamic input-output model was
developed which is capable to evaluate the long-term supply and demand effects of the
Community structural policies. The dynamic input-output model is designed in line with
the multiplier-accelerator analysis of macroeconomic theory. According to this theory it
is expected that new capacities are required if final demand components are growing.
Therefore, induced investment is estimated which can be related to the activities of the
Structural Funds. In the first part of the model it is estimated how an increase of gross
fixed capital formation will affect the economy which was financed by the Structural
Funds to improve the infrastructure of public and private institutions. In the second part
it is analyzed how the contributions of Community interventions affect value added. In
the third part of the impact analysis system a dynamic version of the input-output model
is used to evaluate the long-term supply effects of the Structural Funds.
 The results indicate that the Structural Funds 1989-93 and 1994-99 contribute up
to 1.0 per cent to the anticipated growth rate of GDP in Portugal, Greece, Ireland and
Spain. Steady implementation of the CSF is of crucial importance for the potential
growth of these economies and contributes to a faster growth of capital formation, also
reducing unemployment
 Models for Specific Regions32
• A simplified demand model for the overseas departments of France and Corsica.
 These are not econometric models and the monetary sector is not taken into
account. The parameters are pre-set by experts using available data and information,
into which the CSF data are injected. The formal structure of these models is very
simplified, consisting of  seven equations and 12 variables and their output is somewhat
approximate. The empirical results are presented in Section 5.2, below.
• A General Equilibrium model for the two regions of Italy (Mezzogiorno and Centre-
North).
It is a comparative static model with nine equations (matrix design) which are
used to evaluate macroeconomic impacts on the demand side and sectoral effects. The
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 For a brief description of these models see CEC (1991).
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model can also take into account some supply side effects. The monetary sector is
missing. The empirical results are shown in Section 5.2, below.
5.2. Summary results of the CSF 1989-93
Estimates of the possible ex-ante effects of the CSF 1989-93 (Objective 1) on
the EU economies are given in Table 5, below. The results arrived at using a variety of
different philosophy models, which were presented and discussed above.
Table 5: Expected growth rate of GDP over 1989-93 (per cent)
Including the CSF Excluding the CSF CSF Effect
Portugal 4.1 3.4 0.7
Ireland 4.0 3.7 0.3
Spain (Obj. 1) 3.4 3.2 0.2
Italy (Obj. 1) 2.6 2.4 0.2
UK (Obj. 1) 2.3 2.1 0.2
Greece 1.7 1.2 0.5
Source: CEC (1991), p. 24.
All CSF regions except UK (Northern Ireland) and Greece are expected to grow
above the EU average (2.7 per cent) for the five year period (1989-93). Also, the
greatest contribution to anticipated average annual growth is assigned to Portugal and
Greece, 0.7 and 0.5 per cent respectively, while the CSF effect on other regions is
lower, although significant.
To illustrate the relative importance of the CSF, the effects on the economies are
estimated on the assumption that, ceteris paribus, the transfers were abruptly interrupted
in 1993. As shown in Table 6, most economies would suffer from a severe demand
shock.
Table 6: Expected growth rate of GDP in 1993 (per cent)
Including the CSF Excluding the CSF in 1993
Portugal 3.9 0.9
Ireland 3.5 2.0
Spain (Obj. 1) 3.4 2.4
Italy (Obj. 1) 2.6 1.8
UK (Obj. 1) 1.9 1.1
Greece 1.6 -0.5
Source: CEC (1991), p. 25.
A rough assessment of the relative influence of the CSF on the supply potential
of the economies concerned is provided by the extent to which capital formation is
induced, as shown in Table 7 (though the results account only for the demand effects of
the CSF). The figures clearly illustrate the crucial importance of the CSF
implementation for the potential growth of the economies, through its contribution to
the increase in investment.
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Table 7: Growth rate of Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) and the CSF
Expected growth rate of GFCF
including the CSF (1989-93)
Percentage share of GFCF
depending on the CSF (1993)
Portugal 7.9 23.2
Ireland 8.4 17.7
Spain (Obj. 1) 8.4 6.9
Italy (Obj. 1) 4.1 6.3
UK (Obj. 1) 3.2 12.5
Greece 5.0 25.3
Source: CEC (1991), p. 25.
5.3. Summary results of CSF 1994-99 (mid-term evaluation)
Mid-term evaluations seek to gauge the degree to which programme
implementation matches up to the original goals and, where appropriate, to propose
adjustments in line with the degree of effectiveness achieved. These evaluations have
often played an active part during mid-term reviews and also a certain number of good
practices have been highlighted with a view to the forthcoming programming period.33
The empirical results at the macroeconomic level (Table 8) via model
simulations carried out at CSF level show that Structural Fund support significantly
affects the economic activity of the regions concerned.
In particular, the CSF impact will give rise to a significant GDP increase in 1999
(ranging from 2 per cent in Southern Italy to 5.1 per cent in Spain), as against what it
would have been without the Structural Funds flows. Care should be given to the
comparability of these empirical results due to the use of different models. The impact
on jobs, albeit lower on account of the positive effects on productivity, is also
significant, (ranging from 1.0% additional jobs in Italy to 3.7% in Portugal). The
empirical evaluation of the CSF also showed that substantial progress has been made in
developing basic infrastructure in the Objective 1 regions.
Table 8: Macroeconomic impact(*) of the CSF 1994-99 (in percentages)
Additional GDP Additional Jobs
Portugal 4.4 3.7
Ireland 3.8 3.2
Spain (Obj. 1) 5.1 2.4
Italy (Obj. 1) 2.0 1.0
Germany (Obj. 1) 3.2 1.5
Greece 4.8 2.9
Source: CEC (1998). (*) Compared with the base scenario in 1999 (without CSFs).
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 The results of these studies are presented in CEC (1998).
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5.4. The second cohesion report
Recent empirical evaluations of the CSFs effect on the economy of the cohesion
countries showed that over the ten year period 1989-1999 they have been responsible
for a substantial boost in real growth, especially in Greece and Portugal and less -though
significantly - in Spain and Ireland (CEC, 2001).34 Also, increased growth resulted in
lower unemployment, particularly in Greece and Portugal. Furthermore, the empirical
results showed that the supply-side effects have been equally important to the demand-
side effects and they become predominant in the longer term as the strengthening of
productive potential boosts output.
As for the expected effect of the CSF 2000-2006 on the recipient countries, the
empirical results showed that the structural policies can create an environment for faster
economic growth without inducing inflationary pressures. Furthermore, EU
interventions can increase employment and reduce structural unemployment (CEC,
2001, p. 148).35
Apart from the beneficial CSF effect on GDP and unemployment, these
empirical studies showed that the EU funds do not affect inflation adversely, thus not
creating conditions for “Dutch disease” in the cohesion countries.36
As for the achievement of convergence to the EU average, in terms of GDP per
head, the EU funds definitely offer the opportunity for the cohesion countries to grow
faster than the EU average. However, the governments of the recipient countries can
take more (or less) advantage of this beneficial impact of the EU funding by
implementing more (or less) successful policies. Furthermore, since the comparison of
the GDPs is made at PPP, real convergence is also determined by price developments in
each country, which is a domestic matter. Hence, the speed of catching-up greatly relies
on the ability of each country to achieve good economic performance.
Apart from the assessment of the overall impact of the Structural Funds on the
development of the lagging behind European regions, these studies go through a
detailed evaluation in qualitative and quantitative terms of the particular programmes
and actions.37 For example, they assess the impact of actions supporting SMEs on
regional competitiveness, the effect of the support of research and technological
development and innovation on the strengthening of regional capacity, etc. This kind of
assessment of the CSF actions is definitely very useful, but a detailed presentation and
discussion is beyond the scope of this paper.
In what follows, we discuss the impact of the CSFs on GDP and employment of
the four cohesion economies (Greece, Portugal, Ireland and Spain). The discussion is
based on the results of the ex-ante CSF evaluation using the HERMIN model, adopted
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 These are ex-ante evaluations but they take into account the actual path that the economies of
the cohesion countries followed over the 1990s.
35
 The empirical results are reached via the HERMIN (Bradley, 2000) and the QUEST II
(Roeger, 1996) models. The results of the HERMIN model are more optimistic compared to
those of the QUEST II model, the differences arising from the structure of the two models.
36
 This result is also reached by the great majority of the studies discussed in Section 5, above.
37
 This is a “preliminary ex-post” exercise, since the final ex-post evaluation results will not be
ready before the beginning of 2002.
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by the report of the European Commission (CEC, 2001, p. 131). They are summarized
in Tables 9 and 10, below.
Part (A) of Table 9 depicts the expected average annual impact of each one of
the three CSFs on GDP. The figures refer to the end of period CSF impact on the level
of GDP (as a percentage deviation from non-CSF estimate). The figures show the
expected increase in GDP because of the CSF, compared to what it would have been in
the absence of the EU intervention. This gives a measure of the expected “CSF induced
increase in GDP” for each of the CSFs, in the four countries.
In addition, the figures in part (B) depict the “average annual size of the EU
intervention”, which is given by the average annual percentage share of the CSF in GDP
(taken from Table 2, above).
Finally, the figures in part (C) are the ratios of the expected “CSF induced
increase in GDP” over the “size of the EU intervention”. This is a kind of an
“approximate multiplier”, an index of the “beneficial impact” of CSF with respect to
GDP. The usefulness of this measure is that it is approximately comparable across the
four cohesion countries and also between the three CSFs.
Table 9: Expected effect of CSF on GDP (a)
Greece Portugal Ireland Spain
(A) Increase in GDP due to CSF - ∆Y (b)
1989-93 4.1 7.4 3.2 1.5
1994-99 9.9 8.5 3.7 3.1
2000-06 7.3 7.8 2.8 3.4
(B) Percentage share of CSF in GDP (annual size of CSF) - ∆EU (c)
1989-93  2.6 3.0 2.5 0.7
1994-99 3.0 3.3 1.9 1.5
2000-06 2.8 2.9 0.6 1.3
(C) “Beneficial impact” of CSF with respect to GDP, “multiplier” - ∆Y/∆EU (d)
1989-93 1.6 2.5 1.3 2.1
1994-99 3.3 2.6 1.9 2.1
2000-06 2.6 2.7 4.7 2.6
Average 1989-2006 (approx.) 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.4
Notes: (a) the EU component of CSF; (b) end of period CSF impact on level of GDP, as a
percentage deviation from non-CSF estimate (source: ESRI, estimates based on the HERMIN
model, as quoted in CEC 2001, p.131); (c) source: Table 2, above; (d) ratio of (A)/(B).
In the light of the discussion carried out in Section 3 above, with respect to the
transmission mechanism of the CSF and the factors affecting its functioning, we shall
make comments on the results of Table 9 and offer explanations of the CSF impact on
the cohesion economies. In particular:
• Over the medium-term (1989-2006), the four economies seem to exhibit essentially a
very similar behavioral pattern in relation to the expected CSF impact, since their
“CSF multipliers” (CSF induced effect on the economy per CSF unit of GDP) are of
very similar magnitude. The results indicate that a GDP unit of EU funds is expected
to increase the level of aggregate economic activity by 2.5 per cent, at the end of the
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implementation of the programme.38 This means that, on the average, a GDP unit of
EU funds will increase GDP annual growth at a rate of the order of 0.5 per cent.
Thus, in Greece and Portugal the CSFs with a magnitude of about 3 GDP units are
expected to give an average annual boost to these economies by around 1.5 per cent,
while the relatively smaller CSFs in Spain and Ireland are expected to induce an
average annual growth of about 0.5 per cent.
 The close similarity between the multipliers’ values, though over the medium-term
and on the average, is somewhat striking and needs explanation. I feel that, in
general, macroeconomic models are capable of capturing fairly adequately the
demand side developments of the economy, but they are not sufficiently equipped to
capture the supply side effects. In the case of the CSF effect, the impact of the supply
side factors on the economy is thought to be almost equally as important as the
demand effects. However, the precise quantification of the supply side factors is
extremely difficult, involving the determination of the impact of the CSF projects
upon the productivity of the economy. In fact, the quantification of the supply side
effects is to a great extend subjective stemming from a great number of assumptions
and lying within a reasonable range. Because of these difficulties, in the case of the
CSF, the modeler is tempted to quantify the supply side effects using his experience
in such a way so that the results obtained are reasonable. This is understandable
given the encountered theoretical difficulties and the slim empirical evidence.
 Thus, the results should be viewed with caution and they should be regarded as a
broad indication of the order of magnitude of the CSF effect on the economy. In this
respect, I think they are useful. But they should not be taken at face value, since the
model is not capable to produce accurate estimates.
• These results hold irrespective of the diversity in the four countries in terms of
structure, level of development etc. For example, judging from Greece and Portugal,
we see that although the two countries have very different sectoral structure (the
share of the industrial value-added in GDP is about 30 per cent in Portugal, as
against less than 15 per cent in Greece), the magnitude of the medium-term CSF
effect on GDP is very much the same.
 Again, an explanation of this result is needed, since sectoral structure does not seem
to matter, contrary to the strong tradition among growth theorists pointing to the
opposite direction. This model result may be due to specification deficiencies;
alternatively, it could be attributed to the fact that the CSF impact of the various
sectors is blurred by the “erroneous” differentiated estimates of the supply side
effects of the various sectors. I feel that a more detailed sectoral structure of the
model does not add much to the analysis, since the accurate quantification of the
supply side effect for each sector, although based on precise scientific reasoning, is
effectively arbitrary.
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 The comparisons do not differ significantly if we adopt the results at the QUEST II model,
although the absolute values of the expected effects do differ. That is, the values of the
respective “multipliers” of the QUEST II model for the four countries are also very close,
although their magnitude is lower due to a different model philosophy. In particular, the average
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See Roeger (1998).
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• However, the results indicate that, over the shorter-term, that is during the
implementation period of each one of the CSFs, the behavior of the economy with
respect to the CSF varies both across countries and between the CSFs. These
differences could be explained by the relative success or failure of the micro-macro
policies followed during the application of the structural programmes.39 It seems to
be the case that the quality of the CSF accompanying policies, referred to above, are
very important and they crucially determine the extent of the beneficial CSF effect
on the economy.40
 Table 10: Expected effect of CSF on Unemployment (a)
  Greece  Portugal  Ireland  Spain
 (A) Increase in Unemployment due to CSF - ∆U (b)
 1989-93  -2.9  -4.1  -1.0  -0.8
 1994-99  -6.2  -4.0  -0.4  -1.6
 2000-06  -3.2  -2.8  0.4  -1.7
 (B) Percentage share of CSF in GDP (annual size of CSF) - ∆EU (c)
 1989-93  2.6  3.0  2.5  0.7
 1994-99  3.0  3.3  1.9  1.5
 2000-06  2.8  2.9  0.6  1.3
 (C) “Beneficial effect” of CSF with respect to Unemployment, “multiplier” - ∆U/∆EU (d)
 1989-93  -1.1  -1.4  -0.4  -1.1
 1994-99  -2.1  -1.2  -0.2  -1.1
 2000-06  -1.1  -1.0  0.4  -1.3
 Average 1989-2006 (approx.)  -1.6  -1.3  -0.3  -1.1
 Notes: (a) the EU component of CSF; (b) end of period CSF impact on the unemployment rate,
as a percentage deviation from non-CSF estimate (source: ESRI, estimates based on the HERMIN
model, as quoted in CEC 2001, p.131); (c) source: Table 2, above; (d) ratio of (A)/(B).
 
 The relation between the CSF impact and policy stance (and economic performance)
is better understood if we examine the expected CSF performance in the various
countries. For example, the relatively poor CSF-1 induced growth in Greece (0.4 per
cent annually, per GDP unit of EU funds) can be explained by policy failures during
the first half of the 1990s, while the outcome of the exceptionally successful policies
over the second half of the 1990s are reflected in the unexpectedly high CSF-2
induced growth (0.7 per cent, a year).41 On the other hand, the successful economic
policies in Portugal and Spain over the whole of the 1990s managed to achieve a
smooth and fairly beneficial CSF-1 and CSF-2 induced economic expansion (0.5 per
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 Apart from the results of this model, is has been proved empirically, using different models,
that the kind of micro-macro policies applied during the CSF implementation affect the impact
of the programme on the economy. See for example, Lolos et al. (1995) for the case of Greece.
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 The relation of policy actions to the CSF effects on the economy for the case of Greece is
discussed extensively in Lolos and Theodoulides (2001).
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cent annually, per GDP unit of EU funds).42 Also, the so-called, “Irish economic
miracle” is reflected in the expected impressing beneficial impact of CSF-3 (0.8 per
cent).
 We may note that the variation of the CSF effect between the CSFs is captured by
the model results, reflecting mainly the development of the aggregate economic
variables and the demand components, as the model is well equipped to perform this
analysis.
 With regard to the CSF impact on unemployment reduction, we carried out
similar calculations as for GDP and the results are presented in Table 10, above. In
particular:
• Over the medium-term, the economies of the cohesion countries - except Ireland -
essentially show a quite similar behavioral pattern with regard to the expected
beneficial CSF impact on unemployment, since the magnitude of their relevant
“approximate multipliers” is close to each other. In broad terms, a GDP unit of EU
funds is expected to reduce the rate of unemployment by about 1.0-1.5 per cent, by
the end of the implementation period.
• As in the case of GDP, the results indicate that the CSF induced effect on
unemployment to a large extent depends on policy choice and economic
performance. The beneficial CSF impact on unemployment is expected to be greater
in Greece, especially for CSF-2, compared to Spain and Portugal. For Ireland, the
CSF beneficial effect is diverted to GDP growth and the respective CSF impact on
unemployment is rather small.
5.5. Ex-post CSF evaluation
The results presented above refer to the ex-ante evaluation of the CSF effect on
the economy. However, the question is the extent to which this beneficial effect can
actually be realized. The answer relates to the ex-post evaluation of the CSF.
Methodologically, the ex-post evaluation to a great extent relies on the ex-ante
evaluation, where an effort is made to assess whether the assumptions on which the ex-
ante evaluation is based are valid. This, besides the macroeconomic analysis, involves a
more detailed analysis of the CSF results at regional and sectoral level, which is
complementary to the macro-analysis. The ex-post evaluation of the CSF 1994-99 has
not yet been carried out since the programme has not, in fact, been terminated.
Below, we present the ex-post evaluation results of the Greek CSF 1989-93 to
serve as an example of ex-post evaluations. We also make a judgment (an ex-post
evaluation in qualitative terms) on the expected results of  the Greek CSF 1994-99.
The ex-post evaluation of the Greek CSF 1989-93 has shown that the resources
were fully absorbed but not in an efficient manner (Lolos, 1995).43 In particular, the
direct ex-post impact of the CSF, related to the demand effect was found not to be
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 For a comparative discussion of economic policies between Greece and Portugal see Lolos
(1998).
43
 The ex-post evaluation is based on the ex-ante evaluation using the CGE model for the Greek
economy, see above.
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inferior to the respective ex-ante estimates. Thus, the Programme has given an estimated
boost to the level of real GDP of about 2.5 percentage points while it has been
responsible for the creation of only 45,000 new jobs.44 On the contrary, serious
deviations have been observed between the ex-ante and the ex-post estimates of the CSF
effect on the supply side, greatly curtailing the activation of endogenous growth
mechanisms. This, to a great extent, has resulted from the inefficient functioning of
public administration and the inexperience of management of large-scale projects, the
deficient operation of public and private training schools, the lack of correspondence of
industrial policies with the respective operational CSF programmes, etc.45
In addition, the application of the CSF 1989-93 was not supported by the
adoption of suitable micro-macro policies aiming at promoting structural reform and
reducing the leakages associated with the implementation of the programme. In fact,
over the first half of the 1990s, there have been serious delays in the application of the
necessary accompanying policy measures aiming at a more efficient operation of the
markets (competition improvement, modernization of firms’ institutional and funding
framework, modernization of labor relations, etc.). Thus, the actual (ex-post) CSF 1989-
93 impact on the economy was found to be lower than the initially expected (ex-ante)
result.
However, the CSF 1994-99 can be considered more efficiently implemented
than its 1989-93 counterpart, since not only the demand side multiplier effects were
motivated but also there have been mobilized mechanisms introducing positive
externalities in the production process. The more efficient CSF implementation is
related to the experience gained in materializing extended structural programmes which
gradually improved the quality of implementation procedures of large-scale projects
(e.g. monitoring and production of public works). It is also related to the application of
suitable micro-macro policies over the second half of the 1990s which facilitated
structural reform and improved market functioning. These were the Convergence
Programme that achieved macroeconomic restructuring in favor of investment and
reduced uncertainty, as well as the various measures at microeconomic level aiming at
improving flexibility and competition (e.g. liberalization of financial system).
Furthermore, the CSF implementation has induced much broader structural
changes in the operation of the economy than were experienced earlier. The necessity to
carry out the programme in time disclosed the inefficiency of the public sector and
pressed for its substantial reform. Also, the private sector has gradually been taking over
the management of various projects which in the past was considered to belong to the
public sphere. In addition, the CSF is gradually being conceived by the decision makers
and the public as a reform programme with a long-term perspective and not as a short-
term EU financial assistance. It is also understood that the beneficial impact of the CSF
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 The CSF was expected to raise real GDP by 3.7 percentage points and create about 100,000
new jobs.
45
 Note, for example, that the authorities, in view of the difficulty in absorbing the EC funds in
large-scale construction projects, reallocated a quarter of these funds to the construction of a
great number of small-scale projects of regional range, very useful in local development but
unable to trigger endogenous growth mechanisms. Also, the majority of funds for the
improvement of human capital (e.g. training), were fully absorbed though without adequate
monitoring.
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is neither automatic nor predetermined but it critically depends on the behavior of
economic agents (public and private). These changes become particularly significant
since they are expected to boost economic dynamism and enable the economy to
achieve above EU average growth rates, i.e. to close the development gap.
6. EU structural assistance to the CEECs
The role of the EU structural financing to less developed EU regions has been to
boost the process of real convergence (cohesion), that is closing the development gap
vis-à-vis the wealthier member states. The role of the EU pre-accession instruments to
the applicant CEECs is to facilitate their transition process and to achieve convergence,
that is to catch-up and join the EU. Transition refers to the process of transforming the
former centrally planned economies into open market economies. This process requires
fast rates of growth of the applicant CEECs and bears similarities with the cohesion
process of lagging behind EU countries. As a result, the rationale and the structure of
the EU instruments to facilitate cohesion, discussed so far, is very similar to the pre-
accession EU instruments to facilitate transition, which will be discussed below.
6.1. Pre-accession EU funding
The enlargement of the EU to include the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe necessitated a formulation of the pre-accession strategy for all the applicant
CEECs. The aim of this strategy, included in Agenda 2000, is:
• to provide a consistent and coherent programme for the preparation of these
countries to join the Union;
• to provide with the Accession Partnership a single framework for the various
forms of EU assistance;
• to make the applicants familiar with the procedures and policies of the Union
so that they can participate in EU programmes.
Currently there are three pre-accession instruments for the period 2000-06,
assisting the applicant countries until they join the EU: PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD.
The last two instruments were decided at the Berlin Summit (March 1999).
PHARE was the instrument for the provision of EU financial structural
assistance to candidate countries, since 1989 and up until 1999. For the period 2000-06,
the PHARE financing amounts to about EUR 11 billion through co-financing support. It
aims at promoting regional and social development, industrial restructuring,
development of SMEs and especially at the consolidation of institutions. Its primary
objective is the “institution building” and promoting convergence with the
Community’s acquis communautaire.
ISPA (Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession) aims at the
development of transport and environmental infrastructure. It enables the candidate
countries to meet the EU environmental standards and supports the construction of
trans-European transport networks. ISPA’s financial provisions amount to EUR 1,04
billion a year (at 1999 prices) over the period from 2000 to 2006 and they are to be
divided evenly between environmental projects (including drinking-water supply,
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treatment of waste water, solid-waste management and air pollution) and transport
infrastructure projects of wider Community interest. The rate of assistance will be up to
75 per cent of eligible public expenditure but in exceptional cases up to 85 per cent. The
allocation of  ISPA among recipient countries has been decided by the Commission
using criteria based on population, per capita GDP and land surface.
SAPARD (Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural
Development) aims at the modernization of agriculture, the promotion of the processing
and marketing of products and rural development. SAPARD will be making an annual
provision of EUR 520 million to future member states. By decentralizing management,
the programme aims at giving experience to candidate countries in applying procedures
for managing rural development programmes. However, its contribution to meeting the
challenges in rural areas is limited.
The allocation of EU pre-accession funding over the period 2000-2006 between
the ten eligible countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia)46 is presented in Table 11, below.
Table 11: Annual Breakdown of EU Pre-Accession Funding, 2000-2006
EUR Mn at 1999 prices
PHARE SAPARD ISPA (a) Total
min max min max
Bulgaria 100.0 52.1 83.2 124.8 235.3 276.9
Czech Rep. 79.0 22.1 57.2 83.2 158.3 184.3
Estonia 24.0 12.1 20.8 36.4 56.9 72.5
Hungary 96.0 38.1 72.8 104.0 206..9 238.1
Latvia 30.0 21.8 36.4 57.2 88.2 109.0
Lithuania 42.0 29.8 41.6 62.4 113.4 134.2
Poland 398.0 168.7 312.0 384.8 878.7 951.5
Romania 242.0 150.6 208.0 270.4 600.6 663.0
Slovakia 49.0 18.3 36.4 57.2 103.7 124.5
Slovenia 25.0 6.3 10.4 20.8 41.7 52.1
Total 1085.0 520.0 1040.0 2645.0
Source: CEC (2001, p. 155); PHARE total annual budget is EUR 1,577 million.
(a) The allocation of ISPA, given as a range, is as follows: Bulgaria (8-12 per cent), Czech
Republic (5.5-8 per cent),  Estonia (2-3.5 per cent), Hungary (7-10 per cent), Lithuania (4-6
per cent), Latvia (3.5-5.5 per cent), Poland (30-37 per cent), Romania (20-26 per cent),
Slovenia  (1-2 per cent) and Slovakia  (3.5-5.5 per cent).
It should be noted, finally, that the type of intervention of these pre-accession
instruments is very similar to that provided by the Structural and the Cohesion Funds to
the South-European countries. In particular, ISPA and SAPARD perform the same task
as the Cohesion and the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, also obeying to the
same rationale. The eligible projects for financing are similar to those in the lagging
behind EU regions. In terms of amounts, these funds represent a significant proportion
                                                
46
 Cyprus and Malta were associated with the Union in 1972-73 and received assistance in the
past. For the period 2000-04 they will be receiving EUR 95 million.
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of public investment, while the funds allocated under PHARE to the “institution
building” prepare the candidate countries for managing the structural funds.
6.2. The effect of EU funds on CEE economies
An attempt to obtain an estimate of the likely effects of the EU pre-accession
funds to the CEECs entails risks and difficulties, since we are faced with
methodological and theoretical problems. Besides, the empirical evidence seems to be
rather limited, since there are only two empirical studies, namely the ex-ante evaluations
of the effect of structural programmes on the economies of Latvia and the German Neue
Länder. Furthermore, these evaluations are somewhat mechanistic since they do not put
the structural programmes into a wider perspective, relating them with the specific
national features (micro-macro conditions, institutional setting, stage of development,
etc.).
We shall briefly present the result of these studies, and in view of the experience
with the CSFs of the cohesion countries, we shall make an effort to reach more general
conclusions on the expected impact of the pre-accession funds on the CEECs.
In the case of Latvia, the EU structural intervention is an integral part of the
National Development Plan, 2000-02 (NDP). The size of the plan is significant,
amounting to around 5 per cent of GDP per year on the average. The funding is
provided by domestic and EU sources at roughly equal proportions, while there is a
small contribution (0.5 per cent) by the private sector. Also, the expenditure of the plan
is allocated to three categories. The bulk of investment is directed to the upgrading of
physical infrastructure (over 65 per cent) and to a lesser extent as a direct aid to the
private productive sectors (over 25 per cent, over half of it to agriculture). The
improvement of human capital absorbs a rather small proportion (just over 5 per cent),
which is much lower than the proportion allocated by the CSF in the cohesion countries
(around 25 per cent).
The empirical evaluation of the effect of NDP on the economy of Latvia using
the HERMIN model (Bradley, Kearney and Morgenroth, 2000) showed that the NDP
could raise the level of the GDP by about 6.5 per cent above what it would be in the
absence of the NDP programmes. This result hinges on the assumption that the NDP
continues beyond the terminal year 2002, as it has happened with the CSF in the case of
the cohesion countries. However, the analysis showed that if the programmes are poorly
planned and executed, the beneficial impacts are likely to be more modest.
Note that the size of the Latvian NDP is comparable to the size of the CSFs in
Greece and Portugal. Furthermore, the NDP effect on the Latvian economy is very close
to that obtained in the ex-ante evaluation of the CSFs 2000-06 for Greece and Portugal,
using also the HERMIN model (see Table 9, above). Of greater interest is the fact that a
GDP unit of NDP is expected to contribute to the annual rate of Latvian GDP growth by
0.5 per cent, which is also the average contribution to growth of the European CSFs.
In the case of the German Neue Länder (East Germany), the structural
intervention refers to the CSFs 1994-99 and 2000-06. The size of the former amounts to
around 2 per cent of GDP per year, while for the latter declines gradually to around 1.2
per cent by 2006. The CSFs consist of major public investment projects aiming at
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upgrading the physical infrastructure, the improvement of human capital and also
providing aid to the private productive sectors.
The empirical evaluation of the effect of the CSFs on the economy of the Neue
Länder is carried out also with the HERMIN model (Bradley, Morgenroth and Untiedt,
2000). The results showed that each one of the CSFs could raise the level of the GDP by
around 4 per cent above what it would be in the absence of the structural programmes.
The programmes could also reduce the level of unemployment by around 2 percentage
points. The analysis also showed that the beneficial impacts are likely to be lower if the
programmes are not implemented efficiently.
In the case of the Neue Länder the empirical evaluation showed that both CSF-2
and CSF-3 are expected to increase the GDP growth rate and lower the rate of
unemployment in a very similar way to Latvia. In fact, a GDP unit of each East German
CSF is expected to add 0.5 per cent to annual economic growth, as in the case of the
CSFs of the cohesion countries. Also, a GDP unit of structural intervention is expected
to decrease the unemployment rate by around 0.25 per cent, that is as much as the CSFs
in the lagging behind European countries.
The similarity of these results to those obtained from the cohesion countries
poses questions. The empirical results of the structural interventions in Latvia and the
German Neue Länder seem reasonable and they are based on a precise scientific
reasoning. But the issues raised in Section 5.4, relating mainly to the quantification of
the supply side effects not only exist, but they are more acute here. In the absence of
any empirical evidence, although the assumptions for the quantification of the supply
side factors are analytically presented, we cannot be certain as to how close to reality
they are. Besides, the fact that these results are so close to the average multipliers of the
CSFs in the cohesion countries should make us very suspicious of these calculations.
However, if these results are regarded as a broad indication of the expected order of
magnitude of structural interventions to the CEECs, they are certainly useful.
7. Summary and conclusions
In this paper, we presented the aim and rationale of the EU structural funds, the
CSFs, to the cohesion countries. We also discussed the channels through which the
CSFs affect the economy and presented the methodology for the CSF macroeconomic
evaluation. We then summarized and discussed the contribution of the CSFs to the
cohesion countries, in particular their effect on aggregate economic activity and
unemployment:
• The CSFs are structural reform programmes, consisting of specific actions for the
improvement of physical and human capital. They are expected to improve the
productivity of the economy as a whole by strengthening the endogenous growth
mechanisms. The CSFs aim at enhancing the productive capacity of the economy;
making the operation of the markets more efficient; and alleviating the social
costs of adjustment.
• The positive impact of the CSF on the economy stems from the temporary
demand-multiplier effects (boost in demand due to the inflow of EU funds) and
also from the permanent supply effects (improvement of productive capacity due
to the enforcement of the supply side factors).
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• The assessment of the (macroeconomic) effects of the CSFs on the economy is
approached using economy wide empirical models. The effects of demand side
factors are easily quantifiable using the standard and well developed multiplier
analysis. However, the precise quantification of the supply side effects is a
difficult task due to less developed theoretical instruments and also due to limited,
scarce and ambiguous empirical evidence.
• The empirical assessment of the CSFs effect suggests that they have an important
bearing on the development of the cohesion economies. Also, there is no
indication that the CSFs burden the inflation rate significantly nor that they affect
the exchange rate adversely.
• The magnitude of the positive impact on economic activity varies depending on
the model used, that is on our view of how the economy operates. The majority of
models, including the HERMIN model which is used widely by the European
Commission, arrive at optimistic estimates of the CSF effect on the cohesion
economies: In broad terms and on the average, a GDP unit of EU funds is
expected to rise economic activity of the recipient country by 0.5 percentage unit
and to reduce the rate of unemployment by 0.25 percentage point. However, the
results of models with different philosophy, such as the QUEST II model which is
also considered by the European Commission, arrive at much lower estimates.
Judging from my experience with the evaluation of the Greek CSFs, I would
definitely opt for the more optimistic estimates.
• The discussion of the CSF effect on the economy refers to the expected (ex-ante)
effect, on the assumption of full absorption and efficient implementation of the
programmes. However, it is understood that the ex-post results will be more
moderate, owing to the existence of various economic imperfections which curtail
the beneficial impact of supply side effects of the programme. The deviation
between ex-ante and ex-post results at an aggregate level is very difficult to be
calculated, since it involves a detailed analysis of the particular actions of the
whole programme. Furthermore, the empirical ex-post evaluation studies are
limited to allow us to reach some conclusion only on this issue.
• The experience with the CSF impact on the economy showed that the beneficial
impact is neither automatic nor predetermined. Very important is the role of
accompanying macro-micro economic policies, introducing conditions of
competition and economic stability, during the CSF implementation. The
empirical results showed that sound policies and successful economic
performance increased the beneficial CSF effect on the economy.
 Also, we discussed the aim and rationale of the Pre-Accession structural
programmes to the CEECs and on the basis of the experience of the cohesion countries
with the CSFs, we drew conclusions on the likely effects of potential structural
programmes to the transition countries:
• As an indication, the expected beneficial impact of potential structural
programmes in the CEECs (such as the pre-accession structural funds) on
economic activity should be comparable to the expected impact of the CSFs in the
cohesion countries. This result is related to the fact that the pre-accession
structural funds bear striking similarities in terms of rationale and structure with
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the CSFs to the cohesion countries. Thus, it is reasonable to expect a GDP unit of
EU financial structural assistance to the CEECs to give a boost to GDP growth of
0.5 per cent. Also, it could lower the rate of unemployment by around 0.25 per
cent.
• However, the CEECs can take more (or less) advantage of the EU structural
assistance to promote development and the catch-up process, which depends on
the micro-macro policies they follow during the implementation of the
programme. The implementation of liberalization policies and successful
economic performance definitely increase the beneficial impact of EU assistance
on growth and unemployment. Furthermore, the net result also depends on how
efficiently the programmes are implemented.
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